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And Beyond
Abstract
Although the creation of a federal financial aid system in the United States has greatly expanded opportunity
for students seeking postsecondary education, the higher education financing system faces a handful of
problems in its current state. At the same time that the higher education financing system is facing these
issues, an alternative to traditional student loans known as income-share agreements (ISAs) is gaining
attention. There is currently a lack of federal legislation that provides a national framework for ISA providers
and students to work within. Policymakers are considering this situation and attempting to address it in a way
that properly balances the interests of both ISA student and lenders, but past policy in this arena has had a
tendency to cause effects that were not intended. This study seeks to understand if there is a way that policy
can be examined that allows for the identification of certain types of policy that result in unintended
consequences before the effects go into place. In order to do this, I examine ten higher education financing
policy cases over the past sixty years in an effort to establish a theory of policy that causes unintended
consequences. I then test this theory using three interviews with higher education experts relevant to the ISA
space in an attempt to see if this theory can be applied to additional cases, such as proposed ISA policy. I find
that, although it is difficult to establish a theory that predicts if a policy will cause unanticipated results with
certain, the findings from my case studies and interviews can serve as a set of lessons of what has worked well
and failed in higher education financing policy. As applied to proposed ISA policy, I conclude that policy
entrepreneurs in this space will face difficulty in adopting lessons from past policies due to the challenges to
policy learning they face in the current legislative climate.
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Abstract  
Although the creation of a federal financial aid system in the United States has greatly expanded 
opportunity for students seeking postsecondary education, the higher education financing system 
faces a handful of problems in its current state. At the same time that the higher education 
financing system is facing these issues, an alternative to traditional student loans known as 
income-share agreements (ISAs) is gaining attention. There is currently a lack of federal 
legislation that provides a national framework for ISA providers and students to work within. 
Policymakers are considering this situation and attempting to address it in a way that properly 
balances the interests of both ISA student and lenders, but past policy in this arena has had a 
tendency to cause effects that were not intended. This study seeks to understand if there is a way 
that policy can be examined that allows for the identification of certain types of policy that result 
in unintended consequences before the effects go into place. In order to do this, I examine ten 
higher education financing policy cases over the past sixty years in an effort to establish a theory 
of policy that causes unintended consequences. I then test this theory using three interviews with 
higher education experts relevant to the ISA space in an attempt to see if this theory can be 
applied to additional cases, such as proposed ISA policy. I find that, although it is difficult to 
establish a theory that predicts if a policy will cause unanticipated results with certain, the 
findings from my case studies and interviews can serve as a set of lessons of what has worked 
well and failed in higher education financing policy. As applied to proposed ISA policy, I 
conclude that policy entrepreneurs in this space will face difficulty in adopting lessons from past 
policies due to the challenges to policy learning they face in the current legislative climate.   
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I. Introduction 
A. Problems in higher education financing 
Roughly fifty years after the enactment of the Higher Education Act, which created the 
first version of a federal financial aid system for students in 1965, the system has grown in a way 
that policymakers at the time likely never expected. While President Lyndon Johnson’s intent 
behind the Higher Education Act was to create one national needs-based scholarship program to 
further his anti-poverty efforts, a series of political tradeoffs between the Johnson administration 
and Congress resulted in a bill that included both grant and loan programs in its final version 
(Lumina Foundation 2014). 
According to Hegji, the purpose of the Higher Education Act was to establish a series of 
federal aid programs aimed at providing assistance to both students and institutions (U.S. Library 
of Congress 2014, 1). Specifically, Title IV of the HEA authorizes the student aid programs; 
these programs have grown in number, scope, and funding since 1965 through a series of 
amendments and reauthorizations. Today, the U.S. Department of Education offers over $150 
billion worth of aid each year to students through a number of different grant, loan, and work-
study programs (Federal Student Aid 2012). This high volume of financial aid dollars and large 
range of programs, designed to accommodate all students, have provided opportunity to high-
achievers who would not be able to attend postsecondary education otherwise. However, the 
system in its current state is very complex and can be difficult for students seeking to obtain 
financial aid to understand. 
As college costs have ballooned and more of those who could never finance higher 
education prior to the creation of financial aid have pursued postsecondary opportunities, an 
increasing number of Americans have borrowed loans to pay for these opportunities, and many 
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have found themselves in student loan debt that they struggle to repay. Currently, over 41 million 
Americans owe over $1.2 trillion in outstanding federal loan debt; the debt incurred by students 
and their families has tripled over the past ten years (Perna, Kvaal, and Ruiz 2017, 2). While 
borrowing by both undergraduate and graduate students has increased over time since 1990, the 
total loan debt of borrowers has skyrocketed in recent years, According to Business Insider, from 
2009 to 2017, the student loan debt held by Americans has gone up from $150 billion to $1.3 
trillion (Chaparro 2017). 
The general public and experts alike consider many of the issues described in the current 
state of student loan borrowing, including high level of public dollars used to support student 
lending, the large volume of money borrowed by students, and the inability for some to pay back 
their debt on time as a “student loan crisis” that has the ability to impact the economy. However, 
some such as Akers and Chingos (2016) push back on the extent of this characterization, noting 
that the market for student loans is small and isolated from the private sector (2016, 63). Despite 
disagreement over the potential that the student loan system in its current trajectory has to cause 
significant damage to the economy, there is general agreement over the need to address some of 
its major issues. In addition to the dramatic increase in volume of debt, borrowers currently face 
the problem of default, which occurs when they are unable to make their repayments on time. 
Perna, Kvaal, and Ruiz note that in 2015 alone more than one million students defaulted on their 
Federal Direct Loans (2017, 2). Rather than an entire student loan crisis, some believe that this 
high level of default suggests a loan repayment crisis instead. Dynarski and Kreisman argue that 
since 69% of students borrow less than $10,000 and 98% borrow $50,000 or less to finance 
higher education, most are not actually taking on inordinate amounts of debt as rhetoric suggests. 
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Instead, the high levels of default, particularly among younger workers, indicate that inability to 
repay is driving current issues more so than volume of debt incurred by students (2013, 2). 
In response to repayment and default issues, the federal government has offered income-
driven repayment programs. While these alternate programs were designed to provide borrowers 
with greater flexibility over how to pay back their debt given their income situation, the growth 
of income-driven repayment programs has also added great complexity to the aid system as a 
whole due to the sheer number of alternatives offered. According to the Office of Federal 
Student Aid website, the Department of Education now offers seven different alternate 
repayment plans, in addition to standard repayment. Dynarski and Kreisman describe the plans 
currently offered as a “bewildering array of repayment options” and advocate for this issue to be 
addressed (2013, 2). 
B. Proposed solutions come up short 
There have been a number of efforts to address the issues surrounding mounting student 
debt, high default rates, and the confusing amount of repayment programs offered. Perna, Kvaal, 
and Ruiz note that “[t]he goal of federal student loan policy should be to encourage students to 
enroll and complete a high-quality educational program by enabling students to obtain the 
financial resources needed to pay college costs, without producing too great a loan repayment 
burden” (4). So how have policymakers and other relevant actors attempted to bridge the gap 
between the stated goals of student loan and other financial aid programs and the realities they 
have delivered in more recent years? One of these attempts has been loan refinancing. Akers and 
Chingos discuss the rise of loan refinancing in recent years, noting the role that those who offer 
this service play in allowing students to reduce interest rates on already existing student loans. 
While the growth of this practice indicates that some see refinancing as a viable solution to 
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curbing debt levels and repayment issues, they believe that refinancing is one of the most 
misguided efforts to solving the problems within the current system, as it significantly aids well-
off borrowers more than it provides assistance to those who struggle (2016, 125). 
Another push in recent years to respond to problems within the higher education system 
has been to implement greater accountability at institutions such as for-profit schools. Akers and 
Chingos believe that students who have the highest amount of debt often face this issue as a 
result of attending a for-profit institution (2016, 103). On average, students that attend for-profits 
borrow more than those who attend other institutions; default rates and non-repayment rates are 
also higher for students at for-profits (Perna, Kvaal, and Ruiz 2017, 3). Those who are concerned 
over the high default and non-repayment rates for students at for-profit institutions believe that 
the profit-seeking nature of these schools creates an environment in which those in charge are 
not as concerned with student outcomes. This lack of concern for student outcomes can result in 
lackluster post-graduate opportunities, which would likely translate into a financial inability to 
pay back loans on time. Efforts to boost accountability measures have focused on establishing 
greater consumer protections for those enrolled at for-profits and identifying and removing 
accreditation at weak institutions. However, it is difficult to balance protecting consumer 
interests with allowing private actors to operate freely, and it is not always easy to identify all the 
institutions that are more interested in profits than student outcomes. 
Given the noted complexity rooted in the number of financial aid programs offered, as 
well as the process by which someone applies for and receives aid, solutions to the current 
problems in the higher education finance system also include reducing the numbers of programs 
offered. Akers and Chingos advocate returning to the idea of a single grant and single loan 
program present in the original HEA in order to do this (2016, 128). They believe that having 
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only two types of programs would allow students to better understand the differences between 
programs and make strong decisions about which options are the best for them to pursue. Perna, 
Kvaal, and Ruiz also believe that good information is important for students to make decisions 
about what programs to pursue. They feel that greater simplicity could be achieved by 
condensing the federal financial aid application form (2017, 4). If students access a financial aid 
application that is briefer and less daunting, they will likely feel more confident in their ability to 
understand the different options they can receive and which option is in their best interest. 
Although these types of reforms have been discussed, little progress has been made to achieve 
them.  
C. Growth of the income-share agreement space 
At the same time that higher education leaders are exploring solutions to issues within the 
system such as high debt levels, lack of repayment, and complexity in the number of options 
offered, an alternative to traditional student loans known as income-share agreements (ISAs) is 
gaining an increased presence in the higher education financing space. An ISA is an education 
financing mechanism in which a student has the cost of his education covered by a lender in 
exchange for a percentage of his future income over a set period of time. Although ISAs are not 
an entirely new idea and have been implemented in other countries around the world, 
implementation of the model in the United States has been limited until recent years.  
Currently, there are a number of private entities and even some educational institutions 
offering ISAs. In response to this growth, there have recently been efforts in Congress to create 
ISA policy in Washington, but to little success. Since there is no federal legislation that regulates 
an ISA, policy that dictates how ISA contracts can be constructed is controlled by the state and 
varies across the country. Since the existing regulatory frameworks are limited and varied, there 
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is much ambiguity as to how servicers can offer ISAs and in what jurisdictions. This uncertainty 
could put servicers trying to provide students with an alternative financing option in legal 
jeopardy or allow students to fall victim to agreements that are predatory.   
With ISAs gaining momentum and members of the public expressing concern over the 
absence of national regulation of the model, actors within the ISA space are placing greater 
pressure on Congress to pass legislation that would create a framework in which ISAs could 
operate legitimately at the national level. However, in examining the history of the federal 
financial aid system, it becomes clear that we have arrived at our current issues through a series 
of policy decisions that were made without full consideration of what their results would be. In 
order to avoid this same type of policy creation, it is imperative to consider the unintended 
consequences that higher education financing policy decisions over the past fifty years have had 
and the potential impact creation of ISA policy may have on the system moving forward.  
D. The role of unintended consequences in policymaking 
Akers and Chingos challenge policymakers to put forth a legislative agenda that realigns 
the federal student aid program with the goal of eliminating issues that make higher education 
unattainable for some individuals while simultaneously minimizing unintended consequences for 
the higher education system as a whole (2016, 125-26). As part of these efforts, they advocate 
for the implementation of income-share agreements. Although these two scholars see a realistic 
and attainable path forward for this agenda, history indicates that that even when policy is 
thoughtfully constructed and motivated by the best of intent, it can still fail in practice. 
Inherent in the idea of policymaking is the idea of tradeoffs. Congress may have to 
remove a provision of a bill to obtain the President’s backing. A senator may have to add 
language to a draft in order to get another senator to co-sponsor the legislation. These tradeoffs 
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don’t just occur for those directly involved in the policymaking process. Policy can create 
winners and losers in the general public. One demographic group may be rewarded by a certain 
policy at the expense of another group. These tradeoffs also play a role in terms of available 
resources as well. Funding can be taken from one program and allocated to another whether or 
not this is the responsible financial decision, and time devoted toward one legislative priority 
puts a constraint on others.  
In an attempt to better understand why good policy fails and the role that tradeoffs play in 
policy outcomes, researchers have devoted significant efforts to map out the policymaking 
process. In fully understanding the different stages of the process and the factors that can 
influence each stage along the way, scholars hope to predict outcomes, which can then assist 
practitioners in crafting policy that will have good results. Despite all the research dedicated to 
policy and how the policymaking process functions, academics and legislators alike still find 
themselves unable to predict outcomes that, post-facto, appear to be foreseeable.  
For example, in 2009, The Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS), more commonly 
known as the Cash for Clunkers program, handed out credits to car dealers to distribute to those 
who traded in a less fuel-efficient car for a more fuel-efficient one (Mian and Sufi 2012, 1107). 
The purpose of this policy was to provide a stimulus to the auto industry through new car 
purchases while also increasing fuel-efficiency by removing low fuel-efficient cars from the road 
(Schwartz 2012). However, Cash for Clunkers did a poor job achieving either goal. Mian and 
Sufi find that sales varied widely from state to state during the program, and after it ended, auto 
purchases dropped steadily. Schwartz notes that the fuel-efficiency objective was not fulfilled 
either, as those who owned less fuel-efficient cars often simply traded in that older car for a 
newer, but still low fuel-efficient one. 
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Similarly, in 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act caused effects that were not 
accounted for in the legislation’s original intent. In an attempt to replace old immigration quotas 
with a system that was more family-based, the new law dramatically altered the U.S. 
population’s composition in a way that was unintended (Gjelten 2015). While the bill’s intent 
was to limit the number of Southern and Eastern European immigrants entering the United 
States, the result was a shift away from a trend of immigration from Europe as a whole to a body 
of immigrants that came from Asia and Latin America (Massey and Pren 2012, 1). Massey and 
Pren describe this impact as “a complicated tale of unintended consequences,” as the goal of the 
law was not to foster Asian and Latin American immigration growth but that was seen largely as 
the effect (1). 
Given all the ways that policy can go wrong and the difficulty that exists in being able to 
identify why a policy might fail, what types of factors should policymakers consider when 
creating new legislation? Can we examine cases from the past in which a policy faced a 
particular challenge in practice in order to flag this issue for future policymakers to be aware of? 
In higher education, the existence of federal financial aid programs is relatively new, but there 
nonetheless appears to be a solid group of policies from which unintended consequences can be 
explored. This type of study is particularly well timed, given the emergence of income-share 
agreements in higher education finance and the traction that ISAs have been gaining in recent 
years. By looking at key policies that have shaped the history of higher education finance and 
focusing on the unintended consequences of these policies aimed at removing financial barriers 
for those seeking postsecondary opportunities, this study looks to understand the causes of 
unanticipated consequences set in motion by previous legislation. In understanding these key 
lessons, the research also hopes to use these causes to better understand the relationship between 
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policy and unintended consequences, as well as apply this relationship to identify potential 
policy pitfalls in currently proposed ISA legislation that could be avoided.  
In order to create a baseline understanding of the income-share agreement model and 
provide the context necessary to trace the path from which the growing ISA industry in the 
United States developed, the first section of this thesis explains ISAs and how they function, as 
well as presents the history behind the ISA model. After this necessary understanding and 
context is provided, I will then explore the current academic perspectives used to study income-
share agreements and the theory of unintended consequences. Situated within this exploration is 
an evaluation of the different bodies of literature that compose knowledge on both topics; this 
evaluation serves as method through which I will position this study as one that can add new 
understandings to the identified topic arenas.  
From here, I will transition from background to the original study core to this thesis. 
First, I lay out the questions the study seeks to answer and develop a set of hypotheses I look to 
test. Then, I model the two-step qualitative research study designed to test these hypotheses 
through a series of case studies and interviews. From there, I walk through both steps, present the 
findings gathered from each, and analyze the findings. I conclude with a discussion of what the 
study’s analysis illustrates about the validity of the hypotheses and what the implications of these 
conclusions for the ISA regulatory efforts and public policy field are.  
II. What is an Income-Share Agreement? 
 Since income-share agreements are a novel higher education financing tool that are 
relatively unknown to those outside the higher education and education policy space, this section 
presents what an income-share agreement is, explains the roots of the income-share agreement 
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model, and lays out the developments that have occurred over the years that have led to the 
current state of the income-share agreement space. 
 An income-share agreement (ISA) is a contract in which “investors provide students with 
financing for higher education in exchange for a percentage of their future income for a defined 
period of time after they finish school” (Palacios, DeSorrento, and Kelly 2014, 3). Given 
Palacios and DeSorrento’s position in the space as CEOs of two of the most prominent 
companies (Lumni, Inc. and Vemo Education) to offer ISAs in the United States, this thesis will 
rely on their definition of an income-share agreement. ISAs are similar to loans in that they 
permit students who do not currently possess the financial means to obtain a degree or 
certification to borrow to finance their education. However, with traditional loans, a lender 
provides a student with the capital to pay for his or her program, and the student must pay the 
lender back the amount borrowed plus interest in a series of payments over whatever period of 
time it takes to pay off the balance. 
The main differences between an ISA and a loan exist in terms of what drives repayment 
and the way that time factors into this function. For ISAs, each regular repayment that someone 
makes after completing his or her education is driven by that person’s income at that time. On 
the other hand, loan repayments occur on a more fixed basis and are generated as a result of the 
terms of the contract and interest, both of which range from case to case. In terms of how time 
factors into both models, for income-share agreements, the duration in which someone will make 
their repayment is fixed from the outset of the agreement. For traditional loans, someone who 
borrows may have an estimate of the duration of their repayment, but the period does not end 
until the original amount borrowed plus whatever interest is accrued is repaid. 
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The idea behind the income-share agreement model originated in economist Milton 
Friedman’s “The Role of Government in Education (1955). In this paper, Friedman explores the 
role that government should play in different types of education; he ultimately concludes that if 
the government were to offer an individual funds for his or her professional education “not as a 
subsidy, but as “equity” capital,” and in return, he or she repaid “a specified fraction of his 
earnings above some minimum,” then the existing problems in the marketplace would be 
eliminated and individuals would have greater opportunity to productively invest in themselves 
(1950, 136). 
In the 1970s, Yale University adopted Friedman’s model with some slight modifications. 
Instead of the government providing one individual with the money needed to finance his or her 
education in return for a share of his or her future earnings, Yale would allow a group of students 
to defer tuition payment in exchange for a percentage of their income until the entire group’s 
tuition was paid off. This creation was called the Yale Tuition Postponement Plan (TPO), and 
according to West those who participated agreed to “repay Yale 0.4 percent of their annual 
adjusted gross income per $1000 deferred over a term not to exceed 35 years” beginning in 1971 
(1976, 169). Although the TPO was the first income-contingent loan program to be implemented, 
it ultimately proved to be unpopular amongst Yale students. Palacios Lleras (2004) notes that 
students enrolled in the program did not like having to make payments on behalf of students who 
were unable or perhaps just did not want to repay (126). 
After the unpopular Yale Tuition Postponement Plan, the income-share agreement model 
languished until the 2000s. At this point, a number of different startups and investors began to 
enter the ISA space, creating their own models based on Friedman’s original idea. At a June 
2017 Bipartisan Policy Center event, Purdue University President Mitch Daniels shared that in 
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2016, Purdue became the first major U.S. research university to offer an income-share agreement 
program since Yale’s efforts. Purdue’s “Back a Boiler - ISA Fund” is modeled in a way that 
Purdue graduates receive a six month grace period and then pay a percentage of their income 
based on anticipated salary in their field over a period of about ten years (Back a Boiler 
Overview 2016). According to Purdue’s “Back a Boiler” website, “[t]o date, there are 478 
contracts with students enrolled in Back a Boiler - ISA Fund who have received funding totaling 
$5.9 million.” 
While Purdue is the pioneer in terms of higher education institutions offering income-
share agreements, other smaller private colleges have recently followed its lead. At the June 
2017 Bipartisan Policy Center event, then-President of Washington College (Chestertown, MD) 
Sheila Bair shared her desire to create an income-share agreement program similar to Purdue’s. 
By late 2017, both Lackawanna College (Scranton, PA) and Clarkson University (Clarkson, NY) 
publically announced their efforts to develop ISA programs through partnerships with Vemo 
Education, a company that assists institutions in creating income-share agreement programs. 
There are also a number of vocational schools and coding academies experimenting with ISAs. 
Outside of educational institutions that offer ISAs, there are a handful of startups and 
companies that are also servicers. In 2003, Lumni became one of the first firms to provide 
income-share agreements on the U.S. market (Bloomberg). Lumni entered the U.S. market after 
successfully offering ISAs to students in Latin American countries such as Peru and Chile. Since 
2003, groups such as Vemo, Goal Structured Solutions (GS2), 13th Avenue Funding, Hello 
Align, and Paytronage have joined the income-share agreement space in the United States, 
causing the market for ISAs to expand substantially in more recent years. In February 2018, 
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StockMarketWire reported that from 2016 to 2017, the dollar amount of ISAs offered increased 
300% to $25 million, indicating that this space may continue to grow. 
Now that an income-share agreement has been defined and its background provided, I 
will next present how existing scholarly work understands ISAs. 
III. Blending Concept and Theory 
 This section evaluates two different bodies of literature – income-share agreements and 
the theory of unintended consequences -- in an attempt to position this thesis as a scholarly work 
that can add new knowledge to both arenas. Given the last part of the study focused on the idea 
of income-share agreements, I will start there and present the different perspectives that shed 
light on ISAs and how they can play a role in higher education financing. After that, I will trace 
the theory of unintended consequences from its roots to its position in public policy today. Both 
reviews will conclude with what existing literature tells us about how we currently understand 
each issue and how the subsequent sections of this study seeks to further this understanding. 
A. Four Approaches to the ISA Landscape 
 Since the idea behind an income-share agreement (ISA) is relatively new in the U.S., 
dating back to the 1950s, all literature is from the past fifty or so years, with most of it coming 
out the past decade. As previously mentioned, Friedman is commonly viewed as the founder of 
the idea that would develop into the income-share agreement model. Between his paper in 1955 
and the 2000s, scholarly work does not exist. This is likely due to the commonly viewed failure 
of an attempt by Yale University in the 1970s to implement Friedman’s idea in the school’s 
Tuition Postponement Program (TPP). 
 In recent years, quite a bit of research on income-share agreements has been conducted. 
With major changes and problems occurring in today’s higher education landscape and its 
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associated financing system, scholars have become more interested in exploring solutions to 
these problems. ISAs have served as one of those potential solutions. Major works such as 
Miguel Palacios Lleras’ (2004) Investing in Human Capital: A Capital Markets Approach to 
Student Funding and Beth Akers and Matthew Chingos’ (2016) Game of Loans: The Rhetoric 
and Reality of Student Debt attempt to insert income-share agreements within greater discussions 
surrounding how to address economic and financial issues in higher education. Outside of these 
books, a number of articles and reports published by educational institutions and think tanks 
have explored the viability of ISA implementation. These efforts come in light of the growth of 
the ISA industry and attempts by Congress to propose legislation that would regulate ISAs at the 
federal level. 
 While much of the existing literature reviews the ISA model and potential 
implementation in a positive light, there are a number of different perspectives from which the 
literature explores the role that ISAs could play in higher education financing. Additionally, 
scholars are also well aware of the common criticisms of ISAs and recognize the potential 
pitfalls that could result moving forward. The following portions will present the different 
scholarly perspectives to ISA research and exploration, identify the relevant authors and 
arguments within each perspective, and situate this work’s position within the existing literature 
in order to illustrate how it seeks to add knowledge to what is already known about income-share 
agreements. 
i. ISAs as an Alternative Finance Tool 
 Since some seeking to fix problems in the higher education finance system see ISAs as a 
potential solution, one body of ISA literature explores the viability of income-share agreements 
as alternative to current issues in higher education financing. In Game of Loans, Akers and 
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Chingos note the problems that exist within the higher education financing system as is, such as 
high levels of debt amongst students who borrow, risk allocation in student lending, and 
repayment and default issues. They conclude that income-share agreements could play a role in 
repayment reform by boosting the role that the private sector plays in higher education financing 
by providing students with a new form of lending that has a different repayment structure than 
that of traditional federal student loans. In her 2014 Brookings Report, Akers discusses the role 
that income-share agreements could play in addressing issues within the current state of higher 
education financing more directly than she does in Game of Loans. In this report, she indicates 
three main areas that ISAs can provide benefit: reallocation of risk, better information about 
quality, and lessened psychological cost on borrowers. 
 Horn and Laxton acknowledge that although the existence of federal and private student 
loans has allowed those who cannot afford increasing tuition costs to attend higher education, 
permitting students and parents to borrow up to the full cost of attendance can cause tuition cost 
to rise, another problem commonly cited in higher education today (2017). The report goes on to 
argue that since traditional private loan servicers will only lend to students who have a good 
credit score or a cosigner, some high achievers are left without an opportunity for higher 
education since they cannot access capital to finance it with. It then presents the impact that ISA 
programs could have on these issues by providing an alternative and paves a way forward for 
programs to be scaled up. 
 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2017) and Tyszko and Sheetz (2017) 
promote ISAs as part of their larger arguments about how to address the issues of higher 
education affordability and investment in education. While these arguments are not as related as 
previously mentioned ones to debt and repayment associated with student loans, these two 
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reports still support ISA implementation as a solution to current problems faced by members of 
the higher education system. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences presents ISAs as an 
experiment through which students can finance their education without depending on a 
complicated and inflated public system. On the other hand, Tyszko and Sheetz sees income-share 
agreements as a mechanism that can encourage new ways for people to think about investing in 
education. 
 Baskerville and Fitzpatrick (2017) and American Institutes for Research (2015) express 
similar concerns to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in terms of higher education 
affordability but are more specifically concerned with affordability for low-income students and 
whether or not ISAs can promote greater opportunity for that demographic. Baskerville and 
Fitzpatrick believe that ISAs have “great potential given they offer a cost-efficient manner for 
low-income students to meet college funding gaps” and that developments in the ISA space 
should be tracked in order to better understand how ISA programs can best fulfill that potential 
(29). AIR notes that in theory, income-share agreements could promote better outcomes for low-
income students who have been underrepresented in higher education by providing a greater 
safety net than loans do. However, the report finds that under their evaluation of the current 
market and regulatory environment, no more than five percent of low-income students would 
likely be eligible to receive an ISA (3). 
 While these authors differ in the issues with the higher education financing system that 
they identify, they all recognize that ISAs could be a potential solution to commonly cited 
problems. Rather than simply identifying problems and putting forth that ISAs could be a 
solution, some of the literature ties in relevant economic, financial, and legal concepts as well. 
However, this body of literature as a whole fails to do this. For a greater consideration of these 
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concepts and the relationship that exists between the ISA and those perspectives, I next turn to 
two more schools of thought.  
iii. Economic Perspectives on ISAs 
 A solid amount of work has been done to examine the role that income-share agreements 
can play in higher education from an economics perspective. Given the fact that ISAs are a 
finance instrument and thus can have an impact on the economy if implemented on a large scale, 
this perspective seeks to examine that impact. Scholars such as Palacios Lleras (2004) take a 
markets-based approach to understanding how income-share agreements can have an effect on 
current economic factors such as market efficiency and human capital. He argues that rather than 
financing higher education through debt, as student loans do, the system would operate more 
effectively if a different approach was taken; the approach that he describes views education 
financing as an investment through equity. The book concludes that implementing this approach 
through “human capital contracts” (HCCs), a key idea behind the ISA model, would not only 
bring economic benefit to students, but also to the country as a whole. 
 Palacios further makes his case for income-share agreements as a tool that can bring 
economic benefit alongside DeSorrento and Kelly (2014) in an AEI report that explores the role 
that ISAs can play in combating government and market failure, promoting protected 
opportunity for students, and creating a greater mechanism for strong information quality in the 
marketplace. Outside of Palacios, DeSorrento, and Kelly, AEI has conducted a strong body of 
research on income-share agreements and the benefit they can bring to higher education and the 
U.S. economy as a private-sector financing tool. James (2016) presents the issues that can arise 
out of information asymmetry in the higher education finance system when lenders such as 
private loan companies take advantage of lax regulation and argues that ISAs can mitigate the 
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chances this type of predatory lending occurs. He believes that the private-sector nature of an 
ISA allows for more available funds for student aid; additionally, James explains how the 
incentives that drive lender behavior under the ISA model are more closely aligned with student 
interest. With shared information between the supply and demand sides of student aid, he 
believes that the market for higher education can function much more effectively.  
Rustin IV, Grayson, and DeGroote (2017) from also see the value that better information 
and transparency can have on the economic forces that drive higher education financing. They 
believe that ISAs allow students to make better-informed decisions about investing in their 
education. Since the model is outcomes-driven in the extent that lenders seek to maximize strong 
student outcomes (larger return on their investment) and minimize poor student outcomes (avoid 
facing a loss), these scholars put forth that under this model, decisions will be largely informed 
by predictions and data, resulting in better made decisions by both students and lenders.   
An income-share agreement is similar to a student loan in that both are a form of 
borrowing used to finance higher education, but the two are fundamentally different in terms of 
model and the impact each can have in the economy. Thus, scholarly work attempts to explore 
this discrepancy and try to predict how the development of ISA programs could alter the 
economic principles that currently drive the higher education financing system. This school of 
thought is very useful in understanding how income-share agreements function in an economic 
sense and the role they could play in the U.S. economy if ISAs became a widespread higher 
education finance tool. However, the economic approach to studying ISAs can be a bit 
theoretical or conceptual. For a discussion of how scholars view the way that law or regulation 
could constrain this theory, I turn to the next perspective in ISA literature. 
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iii. Legal/Regulatory Perspective on ISAs 
 An ISA is neither financial aid provided by the federal government nor a student loan 
offered by a private lender, the two main types of assistance higher education students can 
currently take advantage. Thus, it is not entirely clear how this new model should be treated 
under current law. Since there is currently no federal policy governing ISAs, this matter is left to 
the states, which allows for income-share agreements to be treated differently under law 
depending on the jurisdiction under which ISAs are being considered. Additionally, this lack of 
federal recognition and regulation prompts some to doubt the legitimacy and potential of ISAs. 
James and Holt (2015) note the implementation challenges that income-share agreements 
face under current regulatory considerations. They argue that although ISAs have great potential 
to offer benefit to students, existing consumer protection laws for student loans are more harmful 
than helpful in aiming to offer that benefit; since ISAs are not loans in that they don’t have a 
principal balance nor an interest rate and applying the same usury rate concept that loans rely on 
to ISAs impedes on the function of the model, James and Holt push federal policymakers to 
consider new types of consumer protection laws. They see proper ISA policy striking a balance 
between the interest of students and potential lenders. While it is they believe that it is important 
for proper consumer protections to exist so that students are not taken advantage of, James and 
Holt are wary to back standards that are so strict that it is not appealing for lenders to offer ISA 
contracts in the first place. Holt (2017) further emphasizes some of the points him and James 
highlight in an Urban Institute Report arguing in favor of greater emphasis on private higher 
education financing; he notes that without a clearer regulatory structure, potential ISA lenders 
are less likely to enter the space and experiment with best practices that could allow the private 
sector to have a strong positive impact. 
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 Other works also back the idea of creating regulatory policy at the federal level that will 
allow for the balance of interest between students and investors in ISA contracts. Oei and Ring 
(2014) acknowledge that the movement in favor of greater federal regulation of ISAs has been 
growing, but they criticize the approach that these efforts have taken. They argue that since ISAs 
can vary depending on who is offering the contract, the terms of the contract, and the 
circumstances driving the agreement, it is not useful to put into place regulation that governs the 
entire income-share agreement space as a whole. Oei and Ring believe that creating policy that 
allows ISAs to be assessed and regulated on a case-by-case basis is much more effective and 
equitable. Furthermore, these two address a very important criticism toward the ISA model from 
a legal perspective. They note that some compare income-share agreements to indentured 
servitude. Those who put forth this criticism believe that allowing a student to indebt himself to 
society’s investor class could result in a situation in which the student would forfeit his rights 
indirectly through means of financial contract. Once again, Oei and Ring discuss that while the 
argument is not unfounded, ISAs range too largely to categorize the model as a whole as 
something that can be considered indentured servitude and cite legal counterarguments to the 
claim. 
Although James and Holt discuss why from a legal perspective an ISA is not a student 
loan, American Institutes for Research (2015) finds a contradiction to this claim that warrants 
important consideration. The 2015 report asked a group of financial aid administrators from 
various campuses to discuss their experience with income-share agreements in order to better 
understand how an ISA would be packaged in with the rest of a financial aid award given to a 
student on campus. Since there is no federal policy or directive from the Department of 
Education that guides how administrators should deal with ISAs, AIR finds that financial aid 
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administrators must exercise their best judgment and that most would report an ISA as a private 
student loan.   
Overall, the lack of legal clarity and regulatory structure surrounding ISAs sparks a 
discussion amongst scholars about the future of the income-share agreement space under current 
considerations and how the space could potentially develop further with clearer governing 
structures in place. Many of the key legal and regulatory questions scholars pose, including the 
ones mentioned above, are useful to consider; they will continue to be debated until ISA 
providers find a way to most effectively navigate the current situation or structural changes are 
made to the framework that the providers are working in.  
iv. Understanding Public Perception of ISAs 
The presence of ISAs in the public eye is very new, so a body within the modern 
literature highlights the level of ISA awareness student consumers and their parents hold, as well 
as the general attitude of those who are familiar with the model feel toward them. Research 
indicates that few parent and student consumers are familiar with income-share agreements. In 
January 2016, American Institutes for Research (AIR) conducted a series of interviews aimed at 
understanding how students and parents make the decisions necessary to finance higher 
education in order to explore how they would view income-share agreements. For many of the 
participants, the interview was the first time they had ever heard of an ISA (4). Similarly, A 
recent American Enterprise Institute national survey of both current college and high school 
students as well as current and future college parents found that at the outset of the survey only 
seven percent of students and five percent of parents were familiar with ISAs (Delisle 2017, 4-5). 
While the level of initial awareness that student and parent consumers of higher 
education hold toward income-share agreements is rather consistent across studies, their attitude 
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toward whether or not the model is favorable is more mixed. Holt (2016) posits that the results of 
his focus group study on ISAs indicate that participants generally viewed the alternative to 
student loans positively. The January 2016 AIR study also notes that about half of students 
preferred an ISA to a student loan when the two were compared side by side in simple terms (5). 
However, research indicates that once the more detailed terms of an ISA are explained to 
students and parents, attitudes range more. For example, AIR finds that after provided with a 
more detailed comparison between a hypothetical ISA and student loan, interviewee responses 
were less favorable toward ISAs. On the contrary, Peek, Mason, and Soldner (2016) find that the 
specific flexibility and fixed payment components of an ISA are two components key to certain 
individuals’ preference toward ISAs.  
Holt similarly finds in his focus groups that flexibility is one of the most attractive 
characteristics of an ISA in addition to the protections that an ISA allows a student consumer if 
he faces low income or unemployment. However, interestingly enough, flexibility also proved to 
be a common theme cited by participants who disliked ISAs, as they believed a disadvantage to 
the model was that you could not pay it off earlier than the original terms agreed upon. In terms 
of allocation of risk, Holt notes that disagreement over the importance of protecting against a 
negative outcome (downside risk) versus the potential of having to pay significantly more than 
one would have to under a loan (upside risk) proved to be a major dividing factor amongst focus 
group participants. Delisle sheds further light on the importance of risk to student consumers, 
indicating that 38% of his survey respondents said that ISAs are riskier than student loans, 
compared to 34% that said student loans are more risky and 28% who were unsure (2017, 6).  
Despite the existence of research that shows certain groups of student and parents feel 
positively toward ISAs, Evans, Boatman, and Soliz acknowledge the bias implicit when 
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comparing an ISA and a student loan side-by-side as much of existing research does (2017). 
They find that by simply framing a borrowing mechanism as a loan, despite its potential 
similarity to an ISA, high school and community college students are less likely to express 
preference for the tool labeled as loan. In their study, when a loan and ISA were presented side-
by-side and not labeled, more students preferred a loan over an ISA. This research can 
potentially be used to shed light on the inconsistent attitude that student and parents feel toward 
the income-share agreement model across the board, as different ways of communicating an ISA 
may produce a difference in opinion.  
Ultimately, this body of literature focused on understanding how student and parent 
consumers feel about income-share agreements informs the space in a few ways. First, the 
general public does not have very high awareness of ISAs. Secondly, when presented the ISA 
model at a glance, consumers appear to be interested in learning more about how it compares to 
traditional student loans. However, once these students and parents come to understand the 
specific components of an ISA, they tend to differ in terms of opinion depending on their stance 
on important themes such as allocation of risk and flexibility of payment.  
Since research focused on understanding how students and parents view ISAs is only a 
few years old and concentrated amongst a rather small group of authors, future efforts to study 
consumers of higher education may provide new insights. Additionally, as the ISA space is 
constantly evolving, conclusions reached in current literature may not apply to future student and 
parent perspectives. 
Despite the proliferation of literature focused on ISAs from the variety of perspectives 
presented in this section, there is a lack of overall effort within the academic community to 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of prior higher education finance policy decisions in an 
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effort to compare those cases to the current legislative proposals in Congress aimed at guiding 
the income-share agreement space. Unintended consequences, or the idea that public policy can 
result in consequences that the policy creators did not intend to occur, could be a useful lens to 
examine how current proposed policy could alter the ISA space for better or for worse. In the 
next section, I will trace how understandings of unintended consequences have developed over 
the years and how the concept plays a role in the policymaking process today. 
B. Tracing the Theory of Unintended Consequences 
The theory of unintended consequences has been used over the years to analyze issues in 
economics, sociology, and political science. Norton defines the theory as the idea “that actions of 
people—and especially of government—always have effects that are unanticipated or 
unintended” (2008). 
Early works that explore the idea of unintended consequences and the impact that they 
can plays in society include John Locke (1691), Adam Smith (1776), and Frédéric Bastiat 
(1848). In Locke’s 1691 letter to Sir John Somers of Parliament, he advocates against new 
interest rate regulation that Parliament is considering, warning that he believes lowering the 
interest rate would actually hurt borrowers, rather than help them as the policy was intended. 
Smith presents the idea of the “invisible hand” – that an unknown force can that may push an 
individual toward an outcome that he did not intend for. Contrary to Locke’s perspective on 
unintended consequences, Smith sees that they can play a good role in society. He notes that an 
individual, in “pursuing his own interest…frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (400). Bastiat (1848) distinguishes 
between the effects that an action or policy can have on society in his essay “What Is Seen and 
What Is Not Seen”; he believes that the difference between a good economist and a bad one is 
  Zancolli 30 
 
that a bad one can only consider the immediate effects of an action or policy, while a good 
economist recognizes the both the immediate effects and the ones that must been foreseen. The 
immediate effects Bastiat notes are often the intended consequences of policy, while the ones 
that must be foreseen are generally effects that are unintended. 
While Locke, Smith, and Bastiat represent early attempts to understand unintended 
consequences and the role that the theory plays in society, Merton’s 1936 article “The 
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action” is the most comprehensive modern 
work associated with unintended consequences. In this article, Merton identifies five causes of 
unintended consequences: ignorance, error, short-term interest, values, and public predictions. 
While Merton draws from the sociological perspective in identifying these causes, other modern 
scholars such as Wildavsky (1979), Kingdon (2010), Perri 6 (2010), and Stroh (2015) have 
attempted to more closely tie together the theory of unintended consequences with public policy. 
From his experience with the policymaking process in Washington and his research into 
policy implementation, Wildavsky concludes that “[t]he more the nation attempt[s] to control 
public policy, the less control there seem[s] to be” and “[t]he more we do, therefore, the more 
there is for us to do, as each program bumps into each other and sets off consequences all down 
the line” (4). He sees these consequences as having effect out of human control but also believes 
that the results do not always work against public interest. Similarly, Kingdon notes the dual 
existence of positive and negative unintended consequences in public policy (2010). He sees 
negative consequences caused by policy as something that can certainly cause problems, but he 
also discusses how they can indicate the presence of larger, more systemic issues, which 
policymakers can then use to more thoroughly reform whichever arena they are working in. 
Kingdon also discusses how unintended consequences can have a positive impact; he offers the 
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example of the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit, created for fuel saving purposes, which 
resulted in safer highway environments (103). 
Perri 6 expands upon the general classification provided in Merton’s five different causes 
of unintended consequences by establishing a more rigid framework for definition and 
classification of consequence in the context of policy. He defines “a policy outcome [that] might 
be unanticipated, unexpected, unforeseen, [or] unintended” as “one that transpires, but which 
was not conceived in advance by the policy-maker” (2010, 51). He then creates a set of eight 
types of consequences based on whether or not the consequence was anticipated, intended, or 
welcomed. In providing this definition and classification scheme, Perri seeks to address 
confusion that has long-existed in the study of unintended consequences due to an inability to 
more specifically pinpoint and explain ideas implicit in the theory. While Perri 6 simply provides 
a framework for defining and classifying unintended consequences with the goal of promoting a 
better understanding of the phenomenon and the implications it has on public policy, Stroh seeks 
to apply systems thinking to policy issues in order to avoid unintended consequences. He 
believes that if legislators use systems thinking, or “the ability to understand these 
interconnections in such a way as to achieve a desired purpose,” they can predict and eliminate 
unanticipated consequences of policy prior to their development, and he provides a guide 
through which this goal can be achieved (2010, 16). 
Outside of understanding the role that unintended consequences play in public policy 
creation and implementation, scholars have also applied the theory to specific cases. Two 
examples mentioned were earlier – Cash for Clunkers and the Immigration and Nationality Act – 
but there are certainly others that span across a variety of policy arenas. Perry provides a number 
of different examples including how seat belt laws increased the number of car accidents, 
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regulations that reduced logging in national forests may have resulted in more acres being 
deforested, cigarette taxes can decrease government tax revenues, and gun buyback programs 
result in more guns (2013, 2014).  
 Despite the wide array of unintended consequences discussions specific to different 
policy arenas and cases within those arenas, there has not been as much effort to identify the 
existence of unintended consequences in higher education policy outside of the Lumina 
Foundation’s documentary, Looking Back to Look Forward: A History of Federal Financial Aid. 
In the first chapter of the film, “How Did We Get Here: Growth of Federal Student Loans,” 
discussions surrounding a number of significant policy decisions that have guided the federal 
financial aid program from its creation to today by those who were involved in those decisions 
are framed with the lens of unintended consequences. However, the chapter concludes in 2010, 
prior to the push by companies and institutions to offer income-share agreements and the 
corresponding growth of literature aimed at understanding ISAs from a number of different 
perspectives. So, this study seeks to apply unintended consequences to the higher education 
policy arena similar to the Lumina Foundation’s approach but also extend the scope of research 
to today by using a current case of the proposed income-share agreement policy. This lens may 
be usefully applied here in order to assess the drafted ISA policy in an attempt to understand 
what impact it could have if passed prior to the policy going into place. 
 The next portion of this thesis will layout a methodology through which a series of case 
studies supplemented by interviews seek to add a better understanding to literature on ISAs and 
unintended consequences in the ways identified above. First, I will present a series of research 
questions that the study seeks to identify. Then, I will explain the process by which a model was 
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developed to answer these questions and flesh out the rest of the research design that guides the 
qualitative findings that follow. 
Methodology: A Qualitative Two-Step Analysis  
This section poses a series of three interconnected research questions that drive the rest of 
this thesis. From these questions, I develop three similarly related hypotheses to test through a 
qualitative study. A discussion of the study’s design and methodology is presented after the 
hypotheses are laid out in order to provide deeper understanding of how the findings discussed in 
the next section were generated. 
A. Research Questions 
 This paper poses a series of related questions that seek to add knowledge to American 
public policy research. More specifically, these questions focus on the ideas of policy creation 
and policy learning within the larger scope of existing literature. Crucial to this work’s model are 
a background on the history of federal financial aid and an understanding of the theory of 
unintended consequences, which are both discussed within the scope of this thesis, as well as a 
familiarity with the policymaking process in Washington, which is assumed on the reader’s part. 
The core question to be answered through this paper is: how can unintended 
consequences created by higher education finance policy serve as a lens from which political 
scientists can better understand the impact that certain types of policy can have in this arena? In 
the development of federal student aid programs over the past sixty years, a series of intentional 
and unintentional effects have occurred as a result of policy decisions made by a variety of 
different actors. This work seeks to understand if there is a way to study these policies and their 
unforeseen results in order to determine if there is a set of commonalities between situations that 
have led to the development of unintended consequences in higher education. 
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By looking closely at policies from which unintended consequences in the higher 
education finance arena resulted, certain patterns may emerge that could be used to better 
understand what policy factors are at play. If scholars believe that policy can create unintended 
consequences, then there must be some sort of relationship between policy and consequence. To 
what extent can policymakers use this relationship in order to better understand how to avoid 
creating unintended consequences in the education system? 
In order to tie these questions rooted in history and theory to the current problem outlined 
in the introduction, I ask thirdly: how can these conclusions be applied to policy surrounding 
income-share agreements in order to minimize the chances that proposed policy, if passed, cause 
unintended consequences? Income-share agreements are growing in number of servicers as well 
as in public presence, and with two bills aimed at regulating income-share agreements proposed 
in the current Congress, it is an appropriate time to examine what themes amongst higher 
education financial aid policies have led to unintended consequences. In performing this 
examination, it is the hope that information can be gathered that can help policymakers shape 
federal ISA policy that will not result in unintended consequences. 
B. Model & Hypotheses 
The federal financial aid growth and policy developments that have occurred since the 
first federal loan program was created through the National Defense Education Act in 1958 have 
transformed both the U.S. higher education system itself and the country as a whole. While the 
changes that occurred over the years due to policy creation were presumably intended to help 
more Americans go to college, in retrospect, one can see that sometimes changes resulted in 
effects that were unforeseen and at times detrimental. Now, sixty years since the first federal 
loan program was created, there exists a set of various higher education policies that, upon closer 
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consideration, can potentially shed light on how policy creation in this arena can shape the 
system through both intended and unintended effects. 
The objective of this research is not to simply understand higher education policy created 
since 1958, but rather to make connections between a set of relevant policies that have brought 
the financial aid system to where it is today. In making connections across these different 
policies, this thesis aims to identify whether a certain set of conditions exist that make it so a 
policy is more likely than not to result in unintended consequences. If there is indeed a set of 
conditions, the idea is that policymakers could potentially use this to determine if unintended 
consequences would result from a policy decision during the creation process rather than 
thereafter. 
Thus, the research questions posed earlier and model described above set up three 
different hypotheses to be tested. 
1. If financial aid policy since 1958 has resulted in unintended consequences on multiple 
occasions, then we can compare those occasions in order to better understand what type 
of policies result in unintended consequences. 
2. If above is true, then we can use the identified relationship between policy and effect in 
order to minimize future unintended consequences from policymaking. 
3. If both one and two are true, then conclusions drawn can be applied to pending income-
share agreement legislation in effort to prevent the development of unintended 
consequences, and these lessons can potentially be applied across the policy spectrum. 
The premise behind these hypotheses is that if a number of unintended consequences in 
higher education financing have recurred over the years, there may be a way to understand what 
has caused these consequences in comparing the situations side-by-side. If a comparison does 
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show a commonality, this may reveal a set of characteristics related to policy that could indicate 
the potential for unintended consequences to result is more likely than not. Finally, in examining 
the present, it would be interesting if, using the arguments above, it is possible to use lessons 
learned to prevent potential future ISA policy from creating unintended consequences. 
C. Research Design 
Over the years since a federal financial aid system was formed in the U.S., a number of 
different policies have driven the system to where it is today. In order to test whether there are a 
set of characteristics present in the creation of policy that cause unintended consequences to 
result, I perform a comparative case study of a handful of financial aid policies from 1958 to the 
present. These cases are similar in that they all are federal legislation created to further develop 
financial aid programs or correct perceived issues within the system. However, they vary in that 
each case occurred at a different time, had a different specific purpose, and resulted in different 
changes for U.S. higher education. 
The Lumina Foundation’s 2017 documentary entitled “Looking Back to Move Forward: 
A History of Student Financial Aid” features many policy decisions that were crucial in shaping 
the financial aid system throughout its history from the perspective of those involved in those 
decisions. The first chapter, “How Did We Get Here: Growth of Federal Student Loans,” 
published in 2014, traces the expansion of the federal student loan program through the lens of 
unintended consequences. The ten policies highlighted in this chapter serve as the cases for my 
study. In presenting each case, I provide the policy’s purpose followed by the results that it led to 
in order to provide a foundation for further analysis. In order to establish purpose and effects, I 
use the discussions surrounding each of the ten policies in the film as the primary source of 
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information from which my analysis stems. However, I also verify this information using key 
legislative documents of each policy and existing analyses conducted by scholars. 
To analyze each case in this comparative study, I first note the words and phrases present 
in each policy discussion. From there, I analyze the various effects that the policies created in an 
effort to establish a set of common themes. Once themes are established, I use these themes to 
design a code. This code is meant to identify characteristics of each policy that caused the result 
of unintended consequences, which are assumed to have occurred given the discussion framing 
provided by the film, through reoccurrence of code across multiple cases. Finally, the three or 
four codes that repeat most often serve as my theory for what characteristics are more likely than 
not cause the unintended consequences in financial aid policy. 
To test this theory using a present-day example, I interview several actors relevant to the 
creation of pending federal income-share agreement legislation. I ask them if, given their 
expertise, they believe that the causes identified in my theory result in unintended consequences. 
I also ask them if they considered these factors in creating the ISA bills, in an effort to minimize 
unintended consequences.  
At the conclusion of this study, I reconcile the theory generated through the comparative 
case study with the information I gathered through interviews in order to conclude whether or 
not it is possible to determine if certain policy in higher education finance causes unintended 
consequences. Then, I will use this conclusion to determine what, if anything, the relationship 
between policy and unintended consequence can teach about the ability to predict whether or not 
a policy will result in unanticipated results. Finally, I will apply these discussions to the proposed 
ISA legislation and explore what implications these findings have on policy creation as a whole. 
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V. Findings 
 This portion of this thesis lays out the evidence gathered through the above established 
research design in an attempt to answer the thesis’ research questions. First, I present my case 
studies and analyze them in order to develop a theory that is then tested using interviews with 
higher education experts who have had a role in current ISA legislative work. 
A. Case Studies 
 In this section, the ten policy decisions highlighted in “Chapter 1: How Did We Get Here: 
Growth of Federal Student Loans” of Looking Back to Look Forward that serve as the case 
studies for this research are presented. For each case, I provide brief context followed by the 
policy’s purpose and the effects that it had. After the case studies are presented, I analyze the 
policies through a code system created from a set of common themes across the ten policies and 
discuss. This analysis will lead to a theory that aims to predict which characteristics of higher 
education finance policy cause unintended consequences. 
i. National Defense Education Act (NDEA) (1958) 
The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) created the first federal student loan 
program in the United States, the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) Program. As described 
in Looking Back to Look Forward, the purpose of the NDSL Program was to provide assistance 
to students to study science and engineering in the hope that they would go on to aid the country 
in increasing capacity for defense during the Cold War. The NDEA permitted schools to give out 
student loans through the NDSL by providing campuses with funding necessary to grant low-
interest loans (Lumina Foundation 2014). 
Flemming (1960) describes a situation of “personal and social deprivation” in which a 
number of high-achieving students prior to the creation of the NDEA were unable to attend 
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postsecondary education due to conditions out of their control (135). He argues that the objective 
of the NDEA was to prevent this situation and that Titles II through IX achieve this goal by 
“providing liberal loan programs for students who otherwise would be unable to pay the costs of 
higher education” (135). This description of the loan program as “liberal” is aligned with the 
Lumina Foundation’s statement that the NDSL provided low-interest loans to students. More 
specifically, Title III, entitled “Loans to Students in Institutions of Higher Education” states that 
the NDSL intended to reduce student dropouts by “materially assist[ing] institutions of higher 
education to retain their more competent students who need financial assistance in order to 
continue their studies,” which corresponds with the Lumina Foundation description of the NDSL 
as a program that provided money to campuses (Graham 1958, 8). 
In establishing the NDSL, the NDEA set the precedent for student loan programs to 
come. By placing emphasis on science, engineering, and other fields relevant to national defense, 
the policy communicated to the public the country’s priorities at the time. Additionally, in 
providing financial assistance to needy students, the policy also increased opportunity for those 
who could not finance higher education on their own at the time. 
ii. Higher Education Act (HEA) (1965) 
The Higher Education Act established both a national scholarship and national loan 
program through a compromise between President Lyndon Johnson and Congress. As described 
in Looking Back to Look Forward, the scholarship program was designed to be needs based, 
while the loan program was geared toward middle-income students. The loan program developed 
into what would be called the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) Program; this program functioned 
in a way that the federal government would guarantee loans through agencies located in a 
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number of different states, and banks provided the money necessary to fund those loans (Lumina 
Foundation 2014).  
 Mercer and Skinner describe the main goal of the HEA as “to expand postsecondary 
education opportunity, particularly for low-income individuals, and to increase affordability for 
moderate-income families as well” (2007, 1-2). In comparing the design of the HEA as described 
in the Lumina Foundation documentary with this provided objective, the two descriptions match 
up. Title IV, Part B of the original HEA, entitled “Federal, State, and Private Programs of Low-
Interest Loans to Students in Institutions of Higher Education,” aids “[s]tates or nonprofit 
institutions to establish or strengthen low-cost guaranteed loans to students enrolled in eligible 
colleges, universities, business colleges, and technical institutions” (U.S. Dept. of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Office of Education 1965, 11). 
 First and foremost, the HEA created the first national scholarship program as well as 
expanded the reach of student loan programs outside of the scope of education geared toward 
boosting the country’s national defense capabilities. Additionally, while the NDEA provided 
loans on a needs basis, the GSL Program was designed to lend money to middle income groups. 
State programs served as the model for the Guaranteed Student Loan Program and thus resulted 
in a federal scale-up of a state-level initiative to loan students money to finance their education. 
Finally, the combination of the federal government guaranteeing loans and financial institutions 
providing them created a complicated public-private partnership that would continue to develop 
in subsequent years. 
iii. Higher Education Amendments of 1972 
 The Higher Education Amendments of 1972, more commonly known as the 1972 HEA 
Reauthorization Act, added a secondary market, The Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie 
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Mae), to the federal student loan system. As described in Looking Back to Look Forward, Sallie 
Mae was created in order to provide the financial institutions lending money to students with 
greater liquidity by buying the loans from the lenders and thus providing banks with more capital 
(Lumina Foundation 2014). The specific provision responsible for the creation of Sallie Mae 
amends Title IV, Part B of the original HEA with a goal “to establish a Government-sponsored 
private corporation which will be financed by private capital and which will serve as a secondary 
market and warehousing facility for insured student loans” (U.S. Congress 1972, 265).  
 In creating Sallie Mae, the HEA Reauthorization Act of 1972 added further complexity to 
the already complicated public-private partnership established in the original Higher Education 
Act. It also added a marketplace to the higher education system that many policymakers did not 
understand, thus creating a situation from which legislators would be forced to make subsequent 
decisions despite not having strong information on how the secondary market functioned.  
iv. Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) (1978) 
 The Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) removed the income requirement 
of $15,000 per family or less to be eligible for the GSL Program. President James Carter and the 
Congressional Democrats removed the original income requirement at this time in an effort to 
appeal to middle income families and win them over as part of their political base (Lumina 
Foundation 2014). As described in the legislation, the purpose of MISAA was “to provide 
needed financial assistance to students from hard-pressed working class and middle-income 
families” (U.S. Congress 1978). A summary by the Congressional Research Service (1978) 
states that the act achieves this goal in part by removing the adjusted family income requirement 
for qualifying for a student loan. 
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 Removing the GSL Program income requirement through MISAA had a number of 
important effects. First, more students were eligible for the program. Since more were eligible 
for the GSL Program, more applied and received a loan, which meant that a greater number of 
students were serviced under the program. This caused administrative costs to skyrocket, and as 
a result budget constraints came into play. In order to address these budget considerations, a 
student loan origination fee was implemented in the early 1980s (Lumina Foundation 2014). 
v. Higher Education Amendments of 1980 
The Higher Education Amendments of 1980, also known as the 1980 HEA 
Reauthorization, created the PLUS Program in order to provide greater financial assistance to 
families. Under the PLUS program, parents of undergraduate students were eligible to borrow in 
order to supplement student borrowing. Although the PLUS loans were originally capped, by the 
time the legislation was passed, these caps were removed so that parents were able to borrow up 
to the full cost of tuition (Lumina Foundation 2014). Florio (1980) states that the set of 
amendments that were relevant to the creation of the PLUS Program were changes made to Title 
IV of the original HEA (21).  
According to CRS (1980), as a result of the 1980 amendments, parents of dependent 
undergraduates were able to borrow under the same terms as the Guaranteed Student Loan 
Program. In creating the PLUS Program, the HEA Reauthorization of 1980 established a new 
loan program. This new program granted a new group eligibility for higher education borrowing. 
In expanding eligibility to parents, not only could a new group borrow for higher education, but 
also more individuals on the whole became eligible for loans for higher education. By not 
placing caps on the PLUS Program, the 1980 HEA Reauthorization created a situation in which 
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parents could borrow as much as they pleased, whether or not it was likely they would be able to 
pay back the loan as per the terms of the agreement.   
vi. Higher Education Amendments of 1986 
 The 1986 HEA Reauthorization set forth a series of policies designed to address the 
growing level of default rates. First, students who defaulted on the GSL Program were ineligible 
to receive further federal student assistance. Accountability measures were also put into place, 
including language that prevented loan providers from engaging in false advertising practices 
toward students and incentivizing institutions to secure loan applicants. Finally, the 1986 
Reauthorization gave the Department of Education greater oversight and regulatory power over 
providers (Lumina Foundation 2014).   
 Amendments to Title IV of the HEA aimed to combat default in a number of different 
ways. These efforts included, but were not limited to, greater regulatory power by the 
Department of Education, reinsurance fees, a pilot program for the study of default, more 
detailed reporting by credit bureaus, and penalties on institutions with high default rates 
(Congressional Research Service 1986). These provisions established by the 1986 HEA 
Reauthorization addressed growing concerns over default rates and brought greater attention to 
the issue. Since students who defaulted were ineligible under the act for further federal 
assistance, the reauthorization decreased eligibility for aid by limiting those students. Stricter 
scrutiny of lenders and for-profit institutions and greater intervention by legislators and the 
Department of Education were also results of 1986’s HEA Reauthorization. 
vii. Higher Education Amendments of 1992 
 The 1992 HEA Reauthorization created the Federal Direct Lending Program. Under this 
program, the Department of Education was able to provide loans directly to students. The 
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premise behind this program was that lending directly from the federal government would allow 
loans to be made more cheaply in light of budgetary and management constraints. In the 1992 
reauthorization the Direct Lending Program would serve as merely a pilot program that would 
develop into a full-scale program in 1993. Other components of the 1992 HEA Reauthorization 
were the addition of the Unsubsidized Stafford Loan Program and the removal of loan limits for 
the GSL Program. The purpose of the Unsubsidized Stafford Loan Program was to make loans 
more accessible to students from middle-income backgrounds, while the removal of loan limits 
for the GSL program was designed to grant greater access to funds in response to rising costs of 
higher education (Lumina Foundation 2014). 
 According to Hannah (1996) the 1992 HEA reauthorization “authorized what is now 
more than three-quarters of all financial aid available to students enrolled in postsecondary 
education in the United States” (488). More specifically, the amendments created the Federal 
Direct Loan Demonstration Program as part of Part D of Title IV of the HEA. Additionally, an 
amendment to Part B of the HEA focused on creating Unsubsidized Stafford Loans and allowed 
any eligible student to have access to these loans. The limits on loans offered through the GSL 
program were also removed through amendments to Part B of the HEA (Congressional Research 
Service 1992).  
By creating the Federal Direct Lending Program, the 1992 HEA Reauthorization 
attempted to experiment with direct lending. This shift toward direct lending placed a lesser 
emphasis on the role of banks in the student loan process and a greater emphasis on the role of 
the federal government. The Unsubsidized Stafford Loan Program created a new type of loan 
program targeted at expanding opportunity for middle-income students. Finally, removing the 
loan limits for the GSL program allowed for increased access to greater amounts of money in 
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response to the growing price of higher education. However, this increased access also resulted 
in higher debt levels amongst borrowers (Lumina Foundation 2014).     
viii. Student Loan Reform Act (1993) 
 The Student Loan Reform Act introduced the Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan 
in order to respond to the increasing number of students who were having difficulty repaying 
their loans on the standard repayment plan of fixed payments for ten years. The hope behind 
implementing the ICR Plan was that if people were able to repay their loans in an income-driven 
process, then they would be less likely to go into default. Only those who borrowed under the 
direct lending program were eligible for the ICR Plan, and the provisions of this plan stated that 
borrowers could pay the lesser of two options: twenty percent of discretionary income or a 
twelve-year fixed plan (Lumina Foundation 2014). 
 As Gladieux (1995) describes, the purpose of the Student Loan Reform Act was to 
“[alter] the way student loans are financed, originated, serviced, and repaid” (48). All three titles 
of the act contain the provisions that amend the Higher Education Act to allow for Federal Direct 
Student Loans to be repaid an income-contingent basis (Congressional Research Service 1993).  
 By allowing students to repay their loans on an income-driven plan, the Student Loan 
Reform Act provided borrowers with greater flexibility in terms of repayment. It also created a 
situation in which those making repayments were less likely to default since they had this greater 
flexibility and their repayments were determined to an extent by their income at the time. In only 
permitting direct lenders to participate in the ICR Plan, the Student Loan Reform Act made 
direct lending more appealing and also added some complexity -- one type of loan program had a 
repayment option that other federal aid programs did not. 
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ix. College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA) (2007) 
 The College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA) created a new type of income-
driven loan repayment plan known as the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plan. Since the ICR 
Plan established by the Student Loan Reform Act was limited to direct lending, the IBR Plan was 
designed to provide similar flexibility to borrowers under all federal loan programs with the 
exception of those borrowing under the Parent PLUS Program (Lumina Foundation 2014).  
 Packer (2008) notes that as a result of the high level of students who lacked the ability to 
go to college post-high school due to financial constraints, Congress passed the CCRAA in an 
attempt to relieve this type of economic barrier to higher education (221). Title II of the bill 
created the IBR Plan and addresses other income contingent considerations (Congressional 
Research Service 2007). These efforts aim to remove economic hurdles to a college education 
for high school students by providing them with a form of protection in the case that they borrow 
and cannot repay their loans on a standard repayment plan upon graduating.   
 At the time, policymakers believed that trying to combine IBR with ICR was too 
complicated, so the CCRAA oversaw the addition of a second income-driven repayment plan. 
The addition of the IBR Plan also resulted in a new repayment formula. Rather than the lesser of 
twenty percent of discretionary income or a twelve year fixed plan, the IBR Plan set payments at 
fifteen percent of discretionary income. So, the CCRAA further pushed repayment in an income-
driven direction, but it also added some complication in establishing a new plan only applicable 
to certain loan programs with its own repayment formula (Lumina Foundation 2014).  
x. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) (2010) 
 The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) sought to improve the state 
of income based repayment. Under this legislation, IBR terms were revised. The new terms 
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stated that payments would be capped at ten percent of discretionary income and that loans 
would be forgiven after twenty years. In addition to revising the IBR Plan, the HCERA also 
created another plan known as the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Plan. This had the same terms as 
the revised IBR Plan but added a third option for student borrowers (Lumina Foundation 2014). 
 Title II, Part II of the HCERA addresses student loan issues and provides the necessary 
changes to address these issues. In term of income based repayment, the provisions that attempt 
to improve existing options by allowing those who borrowed starting in 2014 to repay annual 
income-based repayments of 10% rather than 15%, as well as requiring loan forgiveness to occur 
after twenty instead of twenty-five years (Congressional Research Service 2010).  
The new IBR terms established by the HCERA capped payments at a lower level and 
allowed for loan forgiveness to occur at an earlier point in time. Additionally, the HCERA added 
a new income based repayment plan to the already existing options with the addition of PAYE. 
The addition of PAYE continued to push repayment further into an income based direction. The 
new plan provided greater flexibility for borrowers looking to explore multiple options, but it 
also added potential confusion if a student borrower did not understand the terms of each plan 
and which option would be most beneficial to him or her.  
xi. Analysis 
 A common theme throughout the case studies is the idea that the path the federal 
financial aid system in the United States took to arrive to the system as we know it today was not 
always deliberate. Those interviewed in the documentary who were involved in the policy 
decisions highlighted acknowledge that certain effects on the higher education system were not 
realized or intended at the time of implementation. In order to better understand why these 
unintended consequences were not seen, I ask of each policy: what caused the effect(s) that 
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policymakers did not see coming? The answers to this question serve as my code from which I 
analyze which causes seem to repeat across these policies that resulted in unintended 
consequences. Repeat causes across different cases help answer the first question that this 
research poses: how can unintended consequences created by higher education finance policy 
serve as lens from which political scientists can better understand the impact that certain types of 
policy can have in this arena? 
 The three causes of unintended consequences that reappeared the most over this set of ten 
cases were policy that resulted in 1) an expansion of financial aid program options for students 
and their families 2) a change in student eligibility for one or multiple financial aid programs and 
3) an alteration to the terms that a student must adhere to after receiving the financial aid. 
Expansion of financial aid programs 
 Although the U.S. financial aid system started off small, the number of different 
programs proliferated in subsequent years. For example, the NDEA established one financial aid 
program, the NDSL, with the specific intent to assist students looking to study science or 
engineering. Then, the Higher Education Act created a national scholarship program that was 
needs based as well as a national loan program that was more focused on middle-income 
students. While President Lyndon Johnson’s intent with the HEA was to expand access to higher 
education for lower-income groups through a scholarship, the legislation that passed included a 
loan program, bringing not just one, but two financial aid programs to the fore. Financial 
institutions were not very supportive of the national loan program, but they did not want the 
federal government to be the body that offered the loans. So what resulted from the creation of 
the loan program was a public-private partnership between the federal government and banks to 
offer loans, which added unforeseen complexity to the financial aid system. 
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 Additionally, adding new forms of financial aid programs was not the only way that 
financial aid expansion caused unintended consequences. Increasing the number of different 
providers had a similar effect. Under the NDSL, the federal government distributed funds to 
schools that then provided the loans to students. Then, the HEA added banks as a relevant actor 
through the GSL Program, as they became the group that lent money to students while the 
federal government just guaranteed them. The addition of banks in the student loan space created 
a complicated public-private partnership as noted above, but not only in the way that establishing 
a loan program on top of a scholarship program created a bifurcated system. In bringing in banks 
as a loan provider, the GSL added a new stakeholder in the financial aid system. By the time that 
the HEA reached its 1992 reauthorization, the federal government would reemerge as a group 
who provided loans via direct lending. Through creation of direct lending, the federal 
government became another relevant stakeholder in terms of student lending. The additional 
stakeholders playing a role in the financial aid system likely added clutter in terms of whose 
interests sparked confusion for students who were responsible for understanding the role each 
actor played in options offered. 
 Even within already established forms of financial aid, policy over the years added more 
options for students. Most recently, the development of alternative forms of loan repayment has 
occurred in order to combat high levels of default amongst borrowers. While these income-based 
repayment plans have provided those who have taken out loans with greater flexibility toward 
how they pay back their loans, the increasing number of plans have also added unnecessary 
intricacy to the student loan system. The Student Loan Reform Act of 1993 created the first 
alternate plan, the Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan. Rather than altering the ICR Plan 
to better align with new goals, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA) established 
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the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plan in addition to the ICR Plan. In 2007, the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) added the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Plan to these 
two existing income-driven repayment plans. Those interviewed in Chapter 1 of Looking Back to 
Look Forward express the sentiment that there was little to no reason that multiple alternate 
repayment programs needed to be created (Lumina Foundation 2014). In fact, they believe that 
the multiple plans make choosing an alternate plan difficult for borrowers, as many do not 
understand the differences between plans or which one is best for them. 
Changing financial aid eligibility 
 The second type of policy that most prevalently caused unintended consequences 
amongst the set of ten case studies was changing student eligibility for financial aid. Policy 
changed student eligibility for financial aid over the years in a number of different ways. Some 
policies expanded or limited who was eligible for an aid program (i.e. undergraduate students, 
graduate students, parents, etc.) Others changed the role that income played in whether or not a 
student was eligible for a program, while another important set of changes altered how much 
financial assistance a student was able to receive. 
 While the original financial aid programs set up through the NDSL and the scholarship 
portion of the HEA were aimed at providing assistance to underserved groups, the GSL portion 
of the HEA as well as the Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) expanded financial 
aid eligibility to middle-income students. In providing loans to middle-income students in 
addition to the original underserved groups, loan volume and GSL program administrative costs 
increased in an unforeseen way. The PLUS Program set up through the 1980 HEA 
Reauthorization permitted parents to borrow in order to supplement whatever aid their student 
was receiving in order to meet the full cost of tuition. Since parent borrowing under the PLUS 
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Program was not capped, expanding loan eligibility to parents resulted in an exacerbated volume 
increase that would set the stage for default challenges faced in the latter half of the 1980s. 
Another way that policy impacted student eligibility for financial aid was by changing the 
way that income played a role in who was eligible for financial aid programs. For example, the 
original GSL Program established by the HEA had an income requirement that limited the 
demographic eligible to borrow. However, MISAA removed this income requirement in an effort 
to allow middle-income students to take out loans as well. As mentioned previously, providing 
financial aid eligibility to a new group through MISAA increased volume of borrowing on an 
unpredicted level. However, MISAA did more than just provide one new group with the ability 
to borrow. By removing the income requirement for student lending, MISAA dismantled a major 
barrier to entry that limited those who did not meet that requirement from borrowing. What 
resulted was a non-restrictive GSL Program, meaning that anyone who under prior income 
requirement was unable to borrow could now receive a loan if he or she wanted to.  
Policy contained in the case studies also altered student eligibility for financial aid by 
changing how much assistance a student was able to receive under a given program. Originally, 
the PLUS Program part of the 1980 HEA Reauthorization capped parents in how much they 
could borrow in loans to supplement their student’s financial aid, but throughout the legislative 
process, these caps were removed. Removing the caps allowed parents to take out whatever 
volume of loans they needed to meet the full cost of tuition. Since the high level of loan volume 
that higher education students took on around this time began to cause default issues, the HEA 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 restricted how much financial aid one could receive, as those who 
went into default were ineligible for further financial assistance. The 1992 HEA Reauthorization 
would return to the issue of loan limits, this time for the GSL Program. Caps on borrowing were 
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removed from the GSL Program in order to respond to the growing demand for loans in the 
context of skyrocketing tuition prices in higher education. While removing these caps was 
designed to increase access to higher education opportunities, the unlimited borrowing power 
under the program caused debt levels to rise.  
Altering terms of financial aid agreement  
 The third identified facet of policy that caused unintended consequences across the cases 
studied was the altering of terms that a student who participates in a financial aid program must 
adhere to. When students receive a loan, they agree to pay back the money borrowed plus 
interest in a certain type of plan depending on the situation. If they default on their repayment, 
they agree to face a certain set of consequences. There is also loan forgiveness that can occur 
depending on the program after a certain number of years given that a borrower meets a 
determined set of provisions.  
 In response to the increasing number of students who had issues repaying their loans after 
graduation for a host of different reasons, the 1992 HEA Reauthorization provided more lenient 
and workable repayment programs for borrowers. This effort provided greater flexibility to 
students struggling to repay their loans under the standard plan, and it also set in motion a push 
for more robust alternate repayment programs. The 1993 Student Loan Reform Act established 
Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), which allowed for borrowers to make payments on their 
loans in a way that was adjusted to their level of income. By making payments driven by income, 
the goal of the ICR Plan was to reduce default. From the ICR Plan came the IBR Plan and PAYE 
in the CCRAA and HCERA, respectively. These repayment plans similarly aimed to reduce the 
heavy burden some faced under standard repayment plans, but each of the various alternate plans 
that developed had its own specific terms and changed the way that borrowers would undergo 
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repayment by those terms. Although these alternate plans were aimed at assisting students with 
repayment, adding a number of different types of plans each with its own provisions made it 
difficult for those entering a new loan to predict what type of repayment options would be 
available to them and understand how to navigate those options. 
 Changes to how default was handled and specific terms of loan forgiveness also occurred 
over the policies presented in Chapter 1 of Looking Back to Look Forward. For example, 
multiple provisions of the 1986 HEA Reauthorization were aimed at fixing problems associated 
with default. In preventing students who defaulted on their loans from accessing further financial 
aid, the 1986 reauthorization created greater incentive for borrowers to adhere to the repayment 
terms of their loan. However, this provision also may have prevented high achieving students 
who were unsure about their outcomes post-higher education from participating in financial aid 
programs out of fear that they may be penalized retroactively. More recent policies have 
implemented loan forgiveness in order to help combat default as well. The idea that after a 
certain period of time with an outstanding loan balance a student’s debt could be dismissed was 
implemented as part of the IBR Plan in the CCRAA. The HCERA then decreased the amount of 
years needed for a loan to be forgiven. While the idea of loan forgiveness was helpful with 
default levels, the different ways that programs implemented forgiveness in terms of what type 
of debt could be forgiven and how many years were needed in order to be eligible may have led 
to confusion amongst students about how loan forgiveness worked.  
 Upon examining the ten cases presented in Chapter One of Looking Back to Look 
Forward a number of common themes emerge that can be useful in trying to understand why the 
policies highlighted resulted in unintended consequences in the higher education system. Based 
on an analysis of the case studies presented in this section, it appears that there is indeed a set of 
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characteristics present in higher education finance policy that can cause unintended 
consequences for the system as a whole. These causes serve as a theory that will be used to test 
whether or not the set of repeated components of past policy can be applied to the proposed 
income-share agreement legislation and the policymaking progress in general. In order to 
perform this test, the next section will present the interview portion of this research, which seeks 
to gain further perspective on this theory by drawing from the knowledge of experts who had a 
role in creating the proposed income-share agreement legislation pending in Congress. 
B. Interviews with Higher Education Experts 
i. Framework  
In order to test the theory I deduced from the case studies that certain types of policy in 
the higher education financing space are most likely to result in unintended consequences against 
a current case, I conducted a series of interviews. There are currently two bills proposed in 
Congress -- H.R. 3145, the ISA Act of 2017, and S. 268, the Investing in Student Success Act of 
2017 -- aimed at creating federal legislation regulating income-share agreements. Since I 
ultimately was interested in understanding if the unintended consequences lens could generate 
new knowledge about income-share agreements, I chose to test my theory against this proposed 
legislation by speaking with people who have played a role in the policymaking process related 
to these bills. 
 First, before beginning the interview process for those involved in the current ISA 
legislation, I wanted to test the validity of my theory as concluded from just the case studies 
before attempting to apply it to the proposed bills. I did this by presenting the theory to the 
creator of the Lumina Foundation’s documentary, Looking Back to Look Forward: A History of 
Federal Student Aid. After speaking with the film’s creator (Interview #1), I then contacted the 
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Congressional offices who originally sponsored the House and Senate ISA bills, Representatives 
Luke Messer (R-IN-6) and Jared Polis (D-CO-2) on the House side and Senators Todd Young 
(R-IN) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) on the Senate side. Finally, I reached out to ISA experts from 
academia and the industry who I knew to have played a role in drafting the proposed legislation. 
 I was able to interview one Congressional staffer (Interview #2) and one industry 
representative (Interview #3) to test the theory created by my case studies and supported by 
Looking Back to Look Forward’s creator. The Congressional staffer I spoke with wrote H.R. 
3145, the ISA Act of 2017, and the industry representative is the CEO of a reputable ISA 
company who was involved in discussions that led to the legislation proposed in Congress. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to speak with all identified Congressional offices or an academic 
expert due to office policy and unavailability.  
Each of the individuals interviewed were asked a couple questions specific to their 
background and expertise as well as three standard questions used to test the theory developed 
from the case studies. These questions were: 1) do you think that policy that expands student 
options for financial aid (i.e. more programs, more providers, more options within program) is 
more likely to result in unintended consequences? 2) do you think that policy that changes 
student eligibility for already existing financial aid programs (i.e. type of student, income 
requirement, borrowing limit) is more likely to result in unintended consequences? 3) do you 
think that policy that changes the terms a student participating in a financial aid program must 
adhere to (i.e. repayment, default, loan forgiveness terms) is more likely to result in unintended 
consequences? Whether or not the person believed the type of policies included within each 
question was considered in the policymaking process that led to the proposed ISA legislation was 
asked in follow-up; this will be discussed at further length in the paper’s conclusion. 
  Zancolli 56 
 
ii. Findings & Analysis 
Generally, the interviewees’ responses indicated that the theory created from the case 
studies identified policy that can lead to unintended consequences in the higher education 
financing system. However, respondents expressed hesitancy to say that type of policy definitely 
would result in unintended consequences. Another important finding to note was that since the 
theory was developed from a case study on federal student aid and that income-share agreements 
are a form of private student aid, the type of policy indicated may not be entirely applicable to 
the current proposed ISA bills. 
For the first question that explores whether expanding financial aid programs causes 
unintended consequences, all three interviewees expressed affirmation. Common in their 
responses was the idea that adding more choices for students seeking financial aid can result in 
unintended confusion, which was a result seen in the case studies. The Congressional staffer 
firmly believes that much of the unintended consequences for federal financial aid programs has 
resulted from students not understanding the full terms of their programs. The ISA company 
CEO echoed this sentiment, adding that providing more choice can make understanding all the 
options and what they mean difficult for students. He believes that this can result in a situation in 
which a student does not know which option is best for him or her and thus makes a poorly 
informed decision to pursue a financial aid program that is not necessarily in his or her best 
interest.  
The documentary creator also noted that expanding financial aid programs can result in 
unintended consequences because offering more options and programs has the possibility to 
attract more students, which expands the pool of people receiving financial aid. When more 
people are receiving financial aid, there is greater diversity in situations and outcomes, so it is 
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difficult to predict how everyone will fare in the higher education system and beyond. A diverse 
pool with a variance in outcomes is inherently more difficult to create good policy for than a 
more homogenous group, which can result in unintended consequences if certain situations that 
arise were not or could not have been realized beforehand. This interviewee also provided 
another explanation for how expanding financial aid options can result in unforeseen situations; 
when a new program is created, it is not always clear how well the program will work in 
practice, and if it does not work well, it may not last. In the case that a program does not last, 
whatever changes made to adjust for the early termination of the program can cause 
complications for the greater higher education system. He cites the addition of loan programs 
such as Parent PLUS or Grad PLUS as evidence behind this. When these programs were added, 
the federal government subsidized private lenders to participate in them. However, when the 
subsidies stopped, the private loans also stopped and direct lending had to be put into place. 
These discussion provided by the documentary creator may be relevant to the proposed 
ISA literature in that another financial aid program can bring new people into the financial aid 
system, and since it is not yet clear what type of students would make use of ISAs on a largely 
implemented scale, creating policy that accommodates to the demographic may be challenging. 
Also, although the ISA model is currently being used by a number of different companies who 
offer the contracts, it is not clear how ISAs would be implemented on a large scale within the 
context of a federally regulated system in the case that legislation passes. If things in this context 
did not function well, ISAs could be scaled back, and this policy reversal could cause 
complication similar to the way the unforeseen switch to direct lending did for Parent and Grad 
PLUS. 
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The documentary creator believes that unintended consequences can result from changing 
the eligibility requirements for an already existing financial aid program for partially the same 
reason they can develop when creating new options for students. When definitions guiding the 
characteristics that students must meet to be eligible for a program change, he notes that this can 
alter the pool of students within the financial aid system just as adding new programs does. 
Adding new students by making eligibility less restrictive or setting standards that incentivize 
certain groups to participate in programs can expand access in an unforeseen way if the policy 
does not accommodate for whatever change may occur. The ISA company CEO also believes 
that changing eligibility can result in unintended consequences and notes the difficulty inherent 
in creating policy that specifically defines who is eligible for a program but is also broad enough 
to be accepted by all relevant parties.  
The Congressional staffer also echoed the sentiment that changing student eligibility for a 
financial aid program could result in unintended consequences, but he is not confident that it is a 
consideration that plays a role in ISA legislation. He explained that an ISA is a contract between 
a student and lender, eligibility does not play the same role that it does when the federal 
government is overseeing a program. When the federal government offers a program, it can 
determine who is eligible for the program and what the program will provide. This can change 
over time, but with a contract offered by a private agency, the federal government is limited in 
how it can influence eligibility, as the contract is an agreement between the student and lender. 
For the last question that considers whether changing a financial aid program’s terms 
after a student has already agreed to receive the aid, responses amongst the three interviewees 
were a bit more divergent than they were for the first two questions. The three interviewees did 
agree that in the most general sense of the idea that changing key factors of an aid program such 
  Zancolli 59 
 
as how repayment is made could result in unintended consequences. However, in actuality and as 
applied to ISAs, their responses varied a bit. The documentary creator said that although 
changing repayment terms could have unforeseen results, he does not believe that this part of the 
theory has as much of a role in causing unintended consequences, especially as applied to 
income-share agreements. He mentioned that changing a program’s terms does not bring more 
people into the pool and increase risk as the above two types of policy do and that the repayment 
terms of an ISA are potentially even clearer than those that drive federal programs.  
Similarly, the Congressional staffer notes that the type of policy implicit in the third 
question is not very relevant as applied to ISAs because they are provided by a private company 
and not the federal government. Since this is the case, the government does not have the ability 
to change the terms agreed upon between a student and the company in the ISA contract. He 
notes that since in the proposed ISA legislation there is a proposed minimum income threshold 
that a graduate must meet or else he is not required to make payments. If Congress were to make 
a change to this minimum threshold, then there could be some unintended consequences. 
However, he argues that those who entered an ISA contract prior to the change would likely be 
grandfathered into the old terms, so the likelihood that those consequences occurred would be 
low. On the other hand, the ISA company CEO was confident in responding that policy that 
changes the terms of a financial aid program after a student participates in the program can result 
in unintended consequences. He shared that he also believes that changing a program’s terms 
through policy after the fact could also have a good impact if unintended consequences resulted 
from the original terms and needed to be adjusted to mitigate those effects.  
In comparison of theory developed from case studies with the knowledge of higher 
education finance experts working on ISAs, the theory in its most general sense was confirmed. 
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As a group, all three interviewees believed that the policy types identified as part of the theory 
have the ability to cause unintended consequences. However, the three experts differed in which 
types they felt had the strongest ability to lead to unintended consequences and how large of a 
role each can play when they are applied across different spaces across the higher education 
finance policy arena. Since responses indicated that the policy types that made up the theory 
aimed at predicting unintended consequences only could lead to unintended consequences, as 
opposed always caused unanticipated results, and opinions between the three interviewees on 
these policies ranged, this test does not validate the theory. However, it also does not invalidate 
it, which is something I will return to in the conclusion. 
The findings developed from comparing the interview evidence with the case study 
theory were not particularly enlightening due to the inability to determine if any of the identified 
policy types definitively cause unintended consequences and variance in response between the 
interviewees. On the other hand, the application of theory to the income-share agreement 
legislative space sheds interesting perspective on the space and the role unintended consequences 
appear to play in it. First, in attempting to apply theory to income-share agreement policy, I 
realized the limited role that qualitative research is able to play at this time. This type of research 
depends on tools such as interviews and surveys that rely on the commitment of people, and 
federal ISA policy is a developing issue that those involved with cannot always share 
information about. Thus, gathering evidence here through qualitative means can be difficult, 
particularly in the case that a Congressional office bars its staff from participating in outside 
research or comment on internal ongoing policy deliberations. Additionally, although developing 
ISA policy appears to be a good place to study the role of unintended consequences in higher 
education finance in a particularly well-timed and interesting case, information gathered during 
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interviews indicate that this may not be entirely true. Respondents noted that income-share 
agreements are a novel higher education finance tool and the developing nature of its policy 
allows for the unintended consequence lens to potentially predict effects in this space. However, 
they pointed out that traditional federal financial aid programs are fundamentally different from 
ISAs in the role that the government versus the private sector plays in each. In the policies 
examined in the case study section, the government had a strong hand in all the relevant financial 
aid programs and thus could heavily shape direction. Conversely, for ISAs, the government has 
comparatively little ability to intervene, as an ISA is a contract between a student and private 
lender. This fundamental difference between how traditional programs are modeled versus an 
ISA begs the question of whether or not findings from past case studies can be applied to the ISA 
landscape and potential policy.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 To conclude, I discuss how the findings from this paper’s case study and interview 
portions answer my research questions generally and then apply these conclusions to the current 
federal ISA legislation that has been proposed. Through these efforts, I seek to communicate 
how this study adds knowledge to both the existing state of income-share agreements and the 
role of unintended consequences in policy process. As mentioned in the section on scholarly 
work to date, there is a lack in the income-share agreement literature that aims to connect past 
policy with the current state of ISAs and already drafted legislation; additionally, a hole exists in 
unintended consequences work as applied to the higher education arena and more recent policy 
cases.   
 In combining the information gathered from the interviews of higher education experts 
working in the ISA space with the theory developed through the case studies, a fuller picture 
emerges that can be used to answer this paper’s core questions. First, in analyzing each case’s 
purpose and effects, a set of common policy themes that can lead to unintended consequences in 
higher education develops. Policy that expands financial aid programs for higher education 
students, changes student eligibility for existing programs, or alters the terms a student must 
abide by after entering a program all have the ability to create unintended consequences in ways 
that have already been described. However, it is important to note that the evidence gathered 
through this study does not support the claim that any of these policy types can be used to predict 
with certainty if unintended consequences will develop. As noted in the introduction, public 
policy is a very complex field. Prior scholars have identified that it is difficult to predict 
outcomes in this field, even when given all relevant information. The inability of higher 
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education experts to validate the predictive nature of a theory developed from the rather 
comprehensive case study presented in this study illustrates this point. 
 Although a comparison of theory developed from cases with evidence gathered through 
interviews does not indicate that a certain theme can be used with certainty to predict whether or 
not a policy will result in unintended consequences, this does not mean that the findings of this 
study are meaningless. As noted in discussions with the interviewees, the types of policy 
identified in the case study’s theory have created unintended consequences on numerous 
occasions in the past and thus have the ability to have the same effect in the future. So, rather 
than using the theory as a predictive measure, it can be used as a set of considerations for 
policymakers to discuss when crafting legislation in the higher education space. Higher 
education experts may be unable to say that adding more financial aid programs to the higher 
education system will always result in unintended consequences, but legislators can make note of 
the fact that adding a new financial aid program has caused unforeseen results in the past and as 
a result keep this in mind for the future. With this consideration in mind, policymakers can use 
this knowledge to guide a policymaking process that results in the achievement of whatever goal 
they are trying to meet through policy as well as does not allow for identified problems from the 
past to reoccur in the future. For example, in the case of creating a new financial aid program, 
the understanding that adding new programs has created complexity within the higher education 
system and confusion for students seeking aid can help policymakers establish a new program 
that is carefully established, strongly administered, and clearly communicated so as to prevent 
this complexity and confusion. 
 This consideration in particular is relevant to how the findings of this study shed light on 
the income-share agreement space and proposed policy surrounding it. Establishing a federal 
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framework for ISAs would add yet another option for higher education students seeking financial 
aid. From the study’s identified theory, this means that there is a potential for unintended 
consequences to result. So have policy entrepreneurs working to develop ISA policy considered 
this? Responses from the interviewees indicate that they have. The ISA company CEO expressed 
concern over adding another choice for students, noting that this action has the ability to confuse 
students about what their options are and what they mean. Furthermore, the Congressional staffer 
noted that in the federal financial aid system, unintended consequences tend to develop when 
students do not understand the full terms of a program.  
 Those involved with the current ISA policy in Congress are faced with a tradeoff, which 
returns this discussion to the policy theory I touched upon in the introduction. Based on 
interview responses, this group clearly understands that there are issues within the higher 
education system, including those discussed earlier, and they believe that ISAs have an ability to 
solve some of these issues. Since they believe that ISAs have this ability but need a federal 
framework to operate within in order to fulfill this ability to a full potential, policy leaders want 
to pass legislation. These same policy leaders are likely frustrated with the status of these efforts; 
attempts prior to this Congress failed to come to fruition, and current endeavors have stalled. At 
an event at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in February 2018, panelists 
suggested that although there is bipartisan support on the proposed ISA bills, Republicans are 
leading the efforts, and some on both sides of the aisle are reluctant to back the cause out of a 
desire to see more data that supports the benefits of ISAs. However, this situation leads to a bit of 
a paradox, as it is difficult for firms to offer ISAs on a scale that would allow for more data and 
to gather evidence on student outcomes without a clear regulatory framework in place.  
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 This lack of progress and frustration over an impasse has the ability to promote efforts by 
the pro-ISA policy group to push their proposed legislation through with little regard for other 
considerations. This is dangerous, especially in the context of the current problems within the 
higher education finance system and the role this study has seen that unintended consequences 
have played historically. If those who back ISA legislation have a goal of passing their bill, it is 
easy for them to neglect to consider the role that unintended consequences have played in past 
policies during the current policymaking process. These considerations require identifying policy 
that has led to unanticipated results, understanding why the results occurred, and determining 
how the current legislation can be crafted to avoid those same effects. All of that takes time and 
effort, and as we know, time dedicated to one set of efforts slows down momentum elsewhere, 
detracting from actors’ ability to push legislation forward in this case. 
 These barriers to progress that ISA policy entrepreneurs face can impede their ability to 
embrace lessons learned from past policies. As stated in Kemp and Weehuzien, an important 
obstacle to policy learning is aversion to failure (2005, 19). In other words, policymakers can be 
reluctant to take what those in the past have learned about policy process and outcomes if they 
believe that adopting this mindset could put their efforts to pass desired legislation at risk. With 
the constraints that those who want to pass ISA policy face laid out and this theoretical 
observation presented, a consideration extremely relevant to this thesis emerges.  
Engaging in a policymaking process that recognizes weaknesses of higher education 
finance policy identified through the lens of unintended consequences exhibits the idea of policy 
learning. Policy learning is useful because it allows policymakers to adopt lessons of best and 
worst practices identified by those who came before them in order to ideally make the 
policymaking process more efficient. However, obstacles to policy learning exist. ISA policy 
  Zancolli 66 
 
entrepreneurs face these obstacles, just as those responsible for higher education finance policy 
have struggled with before them. The Lumina Foundation’s documentary and this thesis’ case 
study illustrate the fact that over the course of the history of the federal financial aid system 
policymakers have fallen victim to barriers that have prevented them from learning in the context 
of unintended consequences. So, will those responsible for ISA policy follow in the same 
footsteps as those before them, or will this be the case in which policymakers in the higher 
education finance arena embrace the ability to learn from the failures of policies before them? It 
all depends on the current ISA coalition’s ability to overcome the current obstacles to policy 
learning that exist, as well as their response to whatever new hurdles may develop in the future.   
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